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The Letter of Intent in International
Syndicated Financing:
An Analysis of the English and
American Law from a Sovereign
Borrowers' Perspective
Alfredo G. Romero*
This article attempts to examine the legal nature of the letter of intent in syndicated credits
and the possible legal actions to be taken against the failure of the lender or arranger to finalize
the financing. The article will focus on sovereign borrowers' syndicated loans. Inasmuch as
State agencies accept the terms and conditions of a credit, they must go through a bidding
process to select the best tender and also request legal approvals from different State entities. In
this respect, the letter of intent will represent the arranging and financing proposal from the
arranger or lender subject to the bidding process and correspondent approvals. Therefore,
when this instrument is formally delivered to a sovereign borrower, it ignites the process that
results in important internal legal and practical consequences for such a particular borrower.
First, the article will provide an introduction to indicate the general objective of the
essay. Second, the article will define the letter of intent and explain the role it plays in the
course of a loan syndication. Third, the article will explain the particular cycle of
approvals from different State entities required in sovereign lending in order to obtain a
final authorization that enables the sovereign borrower to issue a mandate to the lender or
arranger. This is important for our legal analysis of the letter of intent because this pre-
contractual document exposes what will be authorized and thereby be the basis of the
mandate. We will also understand that in sovereign borrowing a great responsibility exists
for sovereign borrowers when contracting indebtedness inasmuch as they are dealing with
State indebtedness. Fourth, the article will focus on the legal nature of the letter of intent
in order to establish possible enforceability of this pre-contractual agreement Finally, after
studying American and English cases and literature in respect to the interpretation of the
wording of the document as well as possible enforceable obligations, the article will try to
identify some legal actions that sovereign borrowers could take against the lender or
arranger's failure to complete a syndicated transaction as offered in a letter of intent.
* Mr. Romero obtained a J.D. from the Catholic University in Caracas, Venezuela, and an MA. from
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. Mr. Romero is admitted to practice law in Venezuela and
works forARM Consultants, SC.
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I. Introduction.
Before a business or financial transaction is formally set up, preliminary negotiations
should come about and some written or oral understanding will establish the frame for
concluding an agreement between the parties.' This preliminary instrument which
"reflects preliminary agreements or understandings of one or more parties to a future con-
tract"2 is what is regularly denominated as a letter of intent.
In general, bankers or businessmen do not pretend to give legal force to this "agree-
ment to agree."3 However, in the case of syndicated finance,.arrangers do require a unilat-
eral commitment from the borrower to guarantee exclusivity to the arranger and to reim-
burse costs and expenses derived from the fund raising process. Understandably, the
promisor of an activity, which depends on many variable circumstances, would not like to
become involved a formal commitment before the offer is definitely secured. Thereby, pre-
contractual agreements are intended to be some kind of "gentleman's agreement" 4 without
legal enforceability for the lender. Nevertheless, the promisor of an activity offered in a let-
ter of intent should be aware that the intention of a non binding agreement is clearly
expressed in the document. Many authors argue,5 that in principle, English and American
law excludes lender liability with respect to letters of intent when those letters are drafted
in such a way that contractual liability depends on the signature of a future contract.
Despite this fact, there could be different interpretations of the wording and the English
and the American courts could define a letter of intent as enforceable even when there are
phrases that imply that it is not. On the other hand, circumstances may exist where a bor-
rower could be able to claim damages when expressed duties such as "best endeavours" or
implied obligations such as good faith have been breached. The legal effects of letters of
intent may be more remarkable in the case of sovereign borrowers. Borrowing States,
unlike corporate borrowers, have to go through a long and tedious process of bidding
rounds and approvals by government dependencies, the Congress and/or the Central Bank
before signing any commitment in connection with an external indebtedness. 6
If, after going through all the above-mentioned processes, an authorization to con-
tract debt is finally met and the lender decides not to lend, the sovereign borrower has
already lost time and money. Additionally, the sovereign borrower may not have enough
time in accordance with the law to apply for a new authorization for a different lending
proposal for the same purpose. The applicable Venezuelan laws explain this situation.
1. RALPH B. LAKE & UGO DRAETTA. LETTERS OF INTENT AND OTHER PRECONTRACTUAL DOCUMENTS:
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND FoRMs. 5-9 (2d ed. 1994).
2. See id. at 5-6.
3. Alpenstow Ltd. v. Regalian Properties [ 1985] 1 W.L.R. 721,726.
4. Id. at 726.
5. See PHILIP WOOD, INTERNATIONAL LOANs, BONDs AND SECURITIES REGULATION 90-91 (1995); ANTHONY
C. GOOCH & LINDA B. KLEIN, LOAN DOCUMENTATION 12 (2d ed. 1991); LAKE & DRAETrA, supra note 1,
at 46-48. RAvi TENNEKON, THE LAW AND REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 46-48 (1991).
6. See Spyros Papanicolaou, Some Experiences of a Sovereign Borrower, in SYNDICATED LENDING:
PRACTICE AND DOCUMENTATION. 48(Tony Rhodes, 2d ed. 1996). See also Jose Angel Gurria-
Trevino, Negotiations with Transnational Banks: A Sovereign Borrower's Perspective, in
INTERNATIONAL BORROWING: NEGOTIATING AND STRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL DEBT TRANSACTIONS
389-90 (Daniel D. Bradlow ed., 2d ed. 1986).
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Besides the Annual Budget Act, which regulates State annual income and spending, an
Indebtedness Act exists which is enacted every year. This Act authorizes the Executive
Branch to contract debt in the correspondent year for a specific maximum amount The
Annual Indebtedness Act is enacted by order of the Public Credit Act. Either the Annual
Indebtedness Act or the Public Credit Act establishes that before signing any commitment
with respect to public debt, the Executive Branch has to request the opinion of the Central
Bank and the Congress. The Annual Indebtedness Act lists the specific projects and the
specific amount of indebtedness in relation to that project to be raised for that fiscal peri-
od. However, there is a two year period in which to materially formalize the indebtedness
e.g. sign the credit agreement--because the process of required approvals could alone take
a year or more. If the financing terms and conditions are modified, it is almost impossible
to find a different financing proposal and obtain new authorization by going to the same
process again.7
Having referred to the restrictions of the sovereign borrower when deciding to raise
financing, the liability of the "arranger"8 is important in respect of a financing offer when,
because of failure to execute the offer, it causes damages to the sovereign borrower as a
consequence of the borrower's reliance on the offer. Accordingly, we will focus on the legal
nature of this financing offer or "credit memo"9 and the possible legal actions that the bor-
rower - in our case a sovereign borrower - might take against the arranger or lender for
failure to complete the offered financing. In English law, a letter of intent containing a
term sheet or financing offer could be interpreted as a contract by the courts and conse-
quently be subject to contractual liability. In order to avoid this, lawyers incorporate the
phrase "subject to contract" into the letter of intent. By including these words a letter of
intent becomes a document containing preliminary agreements that are not binding until
a future contract is signed. In principle, the English courts have held that this phrase is
enough for a letter of intent to be considered non-obligatory. In this respect, Ralph B.
Lake argues that "parties to instruments governed by English law have an almost unquali-
fied ability to remove any doubt as to intentions, by the use of the phrase 'subject to con-
tract "' 10 American law, on the other hand, has a different approach. For American
courts, the objective intention of the parties is more important than the wording of the
document. American courts determine what the parties have intended to agree in the let-
ter by analyzing their expressed intention.11 In spite of the differences of both systems, in
general terms, the applicable English law principle is similar to American law principle.
As observed earlier, in sovereign financing, a letter of intent, in order to be accepted by
the borrower, needs several approvals from different governmental entities. To approve the
terms and conditions of a financing proposal the responsible public official must be aware of
7. See Venezuelan Public Credit Act (Ley Organica de Credito Publico) arts. 3, 19, Official Gazette
No. 35,077 of Oct. 26, 1992.
8. For a definition of an arranger, see J.R. LINGARD, COMMERCIAL LOAN AGREEMENTS: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL LOAN OR MULTIPLE OPnON FACILITY AGREEMENTS 3 (1990). See also Rodhri
Davies & David G. Halliday, Risks and Responsibilities of the Agent Bank and the Arranging Bank
in Syndicated Credit Facilities, 5 J. INT'L BANKING L. 182 (1997).
9. As defined by WILuAM C. HILLMAN, COMMERCIAL LOAN DOCUMENTATION (3d ed. 1990).
10. LAKE & DRAETrA, supra note 1, at 94.
11. Id. at 94-96.
Autumn 1997 
77
the financial advantage and disadvantage that those terms and conditions may generate for
the State.12 It is possible that before accepting a loan offer, the government employee might
have exduded other offers through a bidding process. For example, in the case of Venezuela,
the Ministry of Finance in combination with the end user of the funds normally has to refuse
other letters of intent prior to presenting the term sheet before the Central Bank and the
Congress for approval. In this respect, the public official in charge of the process, if not care-
ful, might become personally negligent for signing prejudicial agreements on behalf of the
State.13 Sovereign borrowers' public officials must be aware of the above situation, even
more so in developing countries where usually a strong political opposition to external
indebtedness exists. Major external debt transactions are cautiously observed by all govern-
mental entities and especially by the political opposition in the Parliament.
In sovereign lending, the financial arranger of the transaction is normally a sophisti-
cated company. The financial arranger should be aware of the government requirements
involved in this kind of transaction. An experienced lender or arranger, who has partici-
pated in several sovereign international credits, is conscious of a sovereign borrower's
responsibilities in an external indebtedness transaction. In this respect, some best endeav-
ours and good faith standard is expected from the arranger or lender in order to raise the
funds. As we will see below, American and English cases may legally support the above sit-
uation. For example, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores,14 an American case, although referring to
a different situation, supports the argument that reliance on a proposal is a determinant
issue to oblige the lender in relation toa letter of intent.15 In reference to this case, Trevor
A. Mills argues that "if one party made a promise that the other party reasonably relied on
and, as a result, significantly altered its position, there is an enforceable promise if it is in
the interest of equity to enforce the promise" 16
As mentioned earlier, the case law in the United States implies that the intention of the
lender is more important than the sole meaning of the document's wording. In Itek Corp.
v. Chicago Aerial Indus. Inc.,17 it was held that in order to define the intention of the letter
of intent, the court must analyze the circumstances that surrounded the negotiations.
Although in less proportion, English courts will also consider the surrounding circum-
stances to define the legal nature of the letter of intent.18 In the case of sovereign lending,
particular circumstances must be taken into account that might lead one to suppose that a
firm obligation from the lender exists when he submits a letter of intent. This is even more
evident when the lender or arranger wins a bid among other prospective lenders or
arrangers to finance the sovereign borrower.
12. See Gurria-Trevino, supra note 6, at 390. See also Guillermo V. Soliven, Syndicated Bank Credits: A
Developing Country's Perspective, in CuRRENT ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW 326 (David
G. Pierce et al. eds., 1985).
13. See Venezuelan Public Credit Act art. 46, Official Gazette No. 35, 077 of Oct. 26, 1992
(Venezuelan Ley de Salvaguarda del Patrimonio Publico).
14. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.W. 2d 267 (1965).
15. Id. at 267; Wisc. See also Trevor A. Mills, Letters of Intent and the Canadian Approach to Good
Faith Bargaining Obligations: "So Close So Far' BANKING & FIN. L. RE.382, 384-85 (1996).
16. See Mills, supra note 15, at 387.
17. See Itek Corp. v. Chicago Aerial Indus. Inc., 248 A.2d 625 (Del. 1968), Mills, supra note 15, at 382.
18. See Alpenstow Ltd. v. Regalian Properties Ltd. [1985] 1 W.L.R. 721, 730. See also Wilson Smithett
& Cape (Sugar) Ltd. v. Bangladesh Sugar & Food Indus. Corp., I Lloyd's Rep. 378 (Q.B. 1985).
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Even though in principle letters of intent under American and English law are nonen-
forceable when they contain wording that conditions the agreement to a future contract,
the lender has to be aware--more in American law than in English law--that the wording
has to be specific enough in order to state the objective intention not to provide the letter
of intent with contractual liability. In a current American case, Lazard Freres & Co. v.
Protective Life Ins. Go., 19 a New York federal court stated that in a case of purchase and sale
of bank debt, commitment letters may be enforceable even though the commitment letter
is subject to a future documentation. Referring to an Arkansas case, Sterling Faucet Co. v.
First Municipal Leasing Corp.,20 Michael L. Weissman states "that these cases demonstrate
the need for careful drafting of letters and related materials which may induce a prospec-
tive borrower to believe that there is a commitment to lend when no commitment is
intended.'
II. Definition and Purpose of the Letter of Intent.
The letter of intent in syndicated financing is the "first serious paperwork generated in
the loan approval process ... prepared by the loan officer ... to commit the lender to a lend-
ing facility.' 22 The concept letter of intent is thereby employed in this paper to define the
document used in syndicated loans, which reflect preliminary understandings that wil be
further documented in a credit contract. However, in credit transactions, this document
has different names, such as: mandate letter, commitment letter, term sheet, financing pro-
posal, and credit offer. In general, whichever denomination is chosen, the instrument is
the same. The letter of intent contains a summary of the financial and legal terms and
conditions for credit. This financing proposal, when agreed upon, will be expressed and
detailed in a loan agreement.23
A letter of Intent may begin as follows(see Schedule I):
Ladies and Gentleman:
We are pleased to confirm our willingness to use our reasonable best efforts in
accordance with our customary practice on your behalf to form a syndicate of
lenders to make funds available to you under a revolving credit agreement con-
taining the terms and conditions outlined below, among others. We-would be
prepared, as a member of the syndicate, to make a loan commitment of
$50,000,000.
19. Lazard Freres & Co. v. Protective Life Ins. Co., No. 94-3959, 1996 WL 223975 (S.D.N.Y May 3,
1996).
20. Sterling Faucet Co. v. First Mun. Leasing Corp., No. LR-C-80-276 (W.D. Ark. 1982), affd 716
F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1983).
21. MICHAEL L. WEISSMAN, LENDER LIABILITY: How TO PROTECT YOURSELF AGAINST UNWARRANTED
SUITS (1988).
22. See Hillman, supra note 9, at 11.
23. See UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH, DEBT AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
LEGAL ASPECTS 104 (1994).
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In this example, the first paragraph of a letter of intent expresses a general intention,
but it also sets forth a general idea of the financial and legal terms and conditions. By
expressing the intention "to make funds... under a revolving credit agreemen, the para-
graph proposes a general idea of the financial structure. Also, an important legal condi-
tion is established by indicating a willingness to provide financing on the basis of "reason-
able best efforts" Below, we will analyze the importance of this last phrase.
Schedule I shows a term sheet where both "terms and conditions" and the "purpose"
of the credit are listed. Regularly, the term sheet of a syndicated loan would enumerate the
following: (i) major issues related to the financial conditions of the credit, such as amount,
name of the borrower(s), creditor(s) and agent(s), maturity, availability, interest, fees, and
other expenses; (ii) major legal terms and conditions, such as a summary of covenants, tax
payment conditions, governing law, jurisdiction, and currency option; and (iii) the pur-
pose of the credit (e.g to finance working capital). 24 As mentioned above, the specification
of these terms and conditions will be further incorporated into the Loan Agreement. After
the terms and conditions are presented, a request from the lender or arranger to the bor-
rower is made in order for the borrower to express acceptance of such terms and condi-
tions. In our Schedule I example, the last paragraph reads:
If these terms and conditions are acceptable to you, please so indicate by execut-
ing and returning to us the enclosed copy of this letter. The commitment set forth
herein will expire on March 8, 1991, unless we have received your acceptance on
or before that date.
Once this request is made, a representative of the borrower will sign the letter expressing
his acceptance of the offer. From this moment, the arranger will be authorized to begin the
syndication arrangement for raising the required funds. The letter of intent is then divided
in two phases. First, in the offer letter phase, the offer is submitted by the financing arranger
or lender for the borrower's consideration of the terms and conditions of the loan. In this
first phase, there is a unilateral intention from a party (the lender or arranger) to raise fimds
on behalf of another party (the borrower). 25 This offer, the offer letter, is signed by the offer-
or (the lender or arranger) and contains a request to the borrower to confirm acceptance of
the offer by signing one copy and sending it back to the lender. The borrower, by signing and
returning the letter, is issuing a "mandate" to the lender or arranger to arrange financing
according to the proposed conditions.26 Accordingly, the second phase, the mandate letter,
comes into place as a response to the financing offer.27 The formal appearance of the letter
of intent arises when signed by both parties.28
Schedule II demonstrates another sample of a letter of intent addressed to a sovereign
borrower. In this case, two different letters are present. One is the offer letter and the other
24. See STANLEY HURN, SYNDICATED LOANS: A HANDBOOK FOR BANKER AND BORROWER 45-56 (1990).
25. LAKE & DRAE'iTA supra note 1, at 134. See also TONY RHODES, SYNDICATED LENDING: PRACTICE AND
DOCUMENTATION (2d ed. 1996); See also Soliven, supra note 12, at 338.
26. See generally Soliven, supra note 12 at 338-39.
27. UNITAR, supra note 23, at 104-05.
28. LAKE & DRAEmrA, supra note 1, at 134.
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document - whose format is actually given as an attachment (Exhibit A) to the offer letter -
is the mandate letter. The latter document begins as follows:
Reference is made to your letter to us dated July 22, 1994, (the "Letter") relating
to your proposal to arrange financing in the amount of $38,511,373 for the
Republic of Ruritania in connection with the Occidental Coastal Region Project
in Ruritania. The Republic of Ruritania (the Borrower) hereby confirms its
acceptance in all respects of such proposal.
Unlike the offer letter, which encloses the unilateral intention of the lender, the man-
date letter contains a confirmation from the borrower with respect to those terms and con-
ditions the offer has indicated. When this first document (the offer letter) is presented to
the borrower, the prospective arranger or lender proposes to raise funds on behalf of the
borrower.29 When the borrower answers the letter accepting the conditions, the arranger
begins to structure the financing on behalf of the borrower. These two phases are impor-
tant for the analysis of the letter of intent in sovereign lending because most of the time,
the sovereign borrower requires a bidding process in order to decide which is the best offer
with respect to its terms, conditions and bank qualifications. 30 The document presented
in the bidding round is the offer letter with its enclosed terms and conditions.
For a better analysis of the letter of intent process, we must understand the syndica-
tion process as a whole.3 1 The syndication process can be divided into two phases: (1) the
mandate phase; and (2) the loan agreement phase. From a sovereign borrower's perspec-
tive, these two phases may further be divided. The mandate phase consists of the following
steps: (i) the borrower issues an invitation to different banks to bid for the arranger's role
(ii) interested banks present an offer document; (iii) the borrower organizes a bidding
round; (iv) the sovereign borrower choses a bank as arranger; and (v) the borrower sub-
mits a mandate letter to the designated arranger.32 The loan agreement phase will be
divided into (i) negotiation and (ii) signature. 33
With respect to the mandate phase - which is the focus of our analysis - Figure 1
below shows the five steps this preliminary process involves. First, the borrower sends an
invitation to all banks - or some specific banks - to participate in a bidding round with the
purpose of arranging financing for a government project or program. Second, interested
banks present their proposals or offer letters. Each offer letter contains particular terms
and conditions that, besides the bank's qualifications, would be the basis upon which the
sovereign borrower determines which is the best proposal. Third, the sovereign borrower
29. See Davies & Halliday, supra note 8, at 182.
30. RHODES, supra note 25, at 146-48.
31. See IAN H. GIDDY, GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 249-52 (1993). See also Peter Wiseman, Syndicated
Facilities, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND INVESTMENT: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATE BANKING, at
257-96 (Brian Terry ed., 2d ed. 1993). See I.D. BOND, THE SYNDICATED CREDITS MARKET reprinted
in UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS INTERNATIONAL (1986); see Henry S. Turrel & Michael G. Martinson,
Arranging and Syndicating Eurocurrency Loans, in INTERNATIONAL BORROWING: NEGOTIATING AND
STRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL DEBT TRANSACTIONS 349-51 (Daniel D. Bradlow ed., 3d ed. 1994).
For a detailed analysis of the syndication process, see generally ROBERT'P. MCDONALD,
INTERNATIONAL SYNDICATED LOANS (1982).
32. For further details about the mandate process, see Hum, supra note 24, at 23-26.
33. See generally UNITAR, supra note 23, at 104-09.
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organizes a bidding round. Fourth, an arranger is designated in accordance with the terms
of its offer. Finally, the borrower delivers a mandate to the arranger to begin the process of
syndication and raise the expected funds. From that moment, the arranger begins to con-
tact other lenders and prepares the loan documentation which will be negotiated further








34. For more information about the legal aspects of the syndication process from a sovereign bor-
rower's perspective, see Soliven, supra note 12, at 336-43. See also Papanicolaou, supra note 6, at
48-50. See UNITAR, supra note 23, at 104-09. For a case study of the borrowing process in
Sweden, see Lars Andren & Bengt Karde, The Raising of a Syndicated Euroloan Facility: A Case
Study of Legal Aspects in SOVEREIGN BoRRowERs 247-57(Lars Kalderen & Qamar S. Siddiqi eds.,
1984).
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III. Internal Legal Process of Approval of Indebtedness by Sovereign
Borrowers: Essential Role of the Letter of Intent in this Process.
(Venezuelan and Mexican Law)
After presenting a general picture of the mandate process and before analyzing the
legal nature of the letter of intent, we will look at the specific legal process of some devel-
oping countries for the approval of State indebtedness. 35 The government, when it con-
tracts debt, does so on behalf of the State. The debt one government administration con-
tracts today will probably be paid by the next administration or administrations and are
eventually paid for by all citizens of the country. Therefore, some laws limit the govern-
ment from acquiring finance by requiring authorization from different entities, such as the
Parliament, and by establishing ceilings on the amount of indebtedness contracted and
executed in the annual budget. In some countries, the Constitution establishes the condi-
tions and restrictions to obtaining government financing and in other countries, specific
indebtedness acts control government financing. 36
In the case of Mexico, the Federal Public Debt Act establishes the legal framework for
obtaining sovereign financing. In most cases, the law requires that a "foreign borrowing
controlling agency" (FBCA) authorize and control any public indebtedness. 3 7 For
instance, any Mexican federal public entity, before officially or informally negotiating any
international finance, must obtain the authorization of an FBCA, which in that specific
case is the Public Credit Secretary (Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico).38 The Public
Credit Secretary will control the correct utilization of the funds provided by public indebt-
edness.39 On the other hand, before any annual fiscal period commences, the federal gov-
ernment must present an Income Act to the Parliament that reflects the expected national
income of the specific year. Accordingly, this Act must express the amount of "net indebt-
edness" needed - either external or internal - to finance the national budget of that year.40
In the case of Venezuela, indebtedness is much more restricted than in Mexico. 4 1 The
constitution provides a general regulation for public indebtedness 42 and, as in Mexico, the
Public Credit Act requires the authorization of an FBCA (the Ministry of Finance) and
establishes that the government must request Parliamentary approval of the net indebted-
ness needed for the year. However, an Indebtedness Act also obliges the government to
35. In this respect, for some borrowing countries' representatives, points of view, see Papanicolaou,
supra note 6, at 47-52; Soliven, supra note 12, at 326-49; Gurria-Trevino, supra note 6, at 389-95
(Mexico).
36. See PADAZIS KARAMANOLIS, THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOVEREIGN SYNDICATED LENDING 42-45
(1992). See also Gurria-Trevino, supra note 6, at 389-90. For specific explanation of the
Venezuelan law, see A.R. BREWER-CARIAS, CONTRATOS ADMINIsTRAnvos 75-97 (1992). For an
analysis of similar public credit restrictions in Spain, see E. GARCIA DE ENTERRIA & T.M.
FERNANDEZ, CURSO DE DERECHO ADMINISTRATIvO 650-51 (1986).
37. See Gurria-Trevino, supra note 6, at 389.
38. See Federal Public Debt Act (Ley de Deuda Publica Federal) art. 6.
39. See id. art. 7.
40. Id. art. 10.
41. See generally JAMES OIIs-RODNER, LA INVERSION INTERNACIONAL EN PAISES EN DESARROLLO, 403-04
(1993); see also BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 36 at 75-96.
42. See VENEZ. CONST. tit. VII, ch. 1, art. 231.
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request authorization from the Central Bank, the Congress, and the Council of Ministers
for each specific credit to be obtained on behalf of the State. 43 The Venezuelan
Indebtedness Act is an annual act subordinated to the Public Credit Act, which lists all pro-
jects and programs with the amounts to be financed by public debt. The Public Credit Act,
on the other hand, establishes the legal process of authorizations, which must be obtained
by the Ministry of Finance, before contracting any internal or external debt.44 Figure 2
below shows that in the case of Venezuela, a tedious bureaucratic procedure is required
before the mandate letter is given. First, the Ministry of Finance (or the end user of the
funds in combination with the Ministry of Finance) invites banks to bid for leading the
arrangement of the loan. Second, banks submit their offer letters. Third, the best tender is
selected after a bidding round after which the Ministry of Finance requests the approval of
the offer letter from the Central Bank (4), the Congress (5), and the Council of Ministers
(6). Finally, after the Council of Ministers (led by the President of the Republic) approves,
the President of the Republic authorizes the Minister of Finance and other officials
involved to deliver the mandate.
Figure 2: Approval offinancial terms and conditions and selection of arranger
or lender (Case of Venezuela)
43. See BkWE R-CARtAS, supra note 36, at 78,85,87,91.
44. SeeVenezuelan Public Credit Act (Ley Organica de Credito Publico) arts. 3,19,29,30,48,50 No. 35,
077 of Oct. 26,1992.
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It is important to notice that in the case of Venezuela, there is a maximum period of
two years from the date the Indebtedness Act becomes legally valid in which to sign the
loan agreement. If, after this time, the loan agreement is not signed, the authorizatton is
lost and a new authorization has to be obtained in the next Annual Indebtedness Act. The
whole process has to start from the beginning. From my working experience at the
Ministry of Finance, I can say that the authorization process in Venezuela could take a yearo
or more before the loan agreement can be signed. Suppose that the whole process is com-
pleted and the mandate letter is given. The designated arranger says that he has used his
best and reasonable efforts and it has not been possible to raise the funds. The normal
action that a typical borrower will take is to request another bank to arrange financing for
him. Nevertheless, in the case of a sovereign borrower such as Venezuela, when the desig-
nated arranger decides to abandon the transaction, there may not be enough time to go
through the whole process from the beginning. Moreover, the indebtedness authorization
will be lost with the possibility of higher financial costs for the project or program.
At this moment, the sovereign borrower would look at the letter of intent. It would
find, at first glance, that no contractual obligation exists in connection with the letter of
intent because there is a "subject to contract" provision which conditions the enforceability
of the agreement until a formal contract is signed. When the borrower looks for a firm
commitment in order to claim specific performance and/or damages, it discovers that the
lender or arranger is only promising a credit on the basis of "best endeavours" or "best
efforts" Does it mean that there is no cause of action for the borrower? In order to analyze
this situation, we will focus on the legal nature of the letter of intent and consider several
issues in connection with the wording of this document.
IV. Legal Nature
In English and American law, freedom of agreement prevails. Prima fade letters of
intent in syndicated finance are, for the courts of these countries, not contracts if parties
clearly express their intention of not having a binding agreement. In this respect, letters of
intent represent, on one hand, a mere proposal from the lender or arranger to arrange
financing and, on the other hand, a preliminary acceptance from the borrower of certain
legal and financial terms and conditions in order for the arranger to raise the expected
funds in the financial market. In general terms, letters of intent constitute a "mere negoti-
ation in contemplation of a contract coming into existence at some future date."45
However, as will be explained below, in syndicated loans, letters of intent are intended to
be binding at least in relation to two issues. First, they contain a commitment from the
borrower to pay costs and expenses to the lender or arranger in regard to the arrangement
of the credit. Second, they include a best endeavours obligation by the lender or arranger
to collect money required by the borrower.
From a legal perspective, letters of intent are ambiguous and obscure documents. They
lie in an "undear gray zone"46 Many times lawyers do not even participate in drafting these
45. See Branca v. Cobarro, K.B. 854 (1947).
46. LAKE & DRAETrA, note 1 at 10-11.
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documents. Bankers believe that lawyers begin to participate from the loan agreement and
beyond. *Actually, letters of intent come into the picture for commercial reasons and they
are not intended to be enforceable documents. "In this respect the use of letters of intent
provides a convenient excuse to leave lawyers out of the negotiating process.... " 47 The man-
date establishes the platform for beginning the preliminary process of raising the money.
Such a process basically consists of contacting banks, preparing a term sheet to outline the
conditions of the credit for prospective lenders, producing the information memorandum,
and negotiating the loan agreement. 48 In other words, a letter of intent constitutes an
assurance to the arranger that the borrower intends to obtain financing according to a price
and under general financial and legal terms and conditions, but excludes the lender from
any firm or specific commitment The volatility of the international financial market is one
of the reasons why lenders assume that these offer letters - returned to the lender as a man-
date letter - are not final commitments. 49 When the arranger receives the mandate from
the borrower, the former will begin the marketing of the loan in order to achieve the
required financing.5 0 Market expectations in relation to a borrower entity might vary from
one day to another. In the case of sovereign lending, "country risk"51 and "sovereign risk"52
are important and economic and political factors53 may prevent the government from
repaying public debt For instance, the Mexican peso devaluation in 1994 had an important
negative effect on debt transactions in most of Latin America (the "tequila effect"). As a
general reaction to the crisis, financial investors preferred to shift their financial investments
47. Id.
48. See T.H. DONALDSON, LENDING IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANKING 82-85 (2d ed. 1988). See
also EPHRAIM CLARK ET AL., INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 410-11 (1993).
49. See GUNTER DUFEY & IAN H. GIDDY, THE INTERNATIONAL MONEY MARKET (1978). For an example
of a syndicated loan transaction to United Airlines (UAL) which fails inasmuch as "adverse
events" affected the "market's attitude", see Peter Lee, UAL: Inside the Fiasco of the Decadein
EUROMONEY, Nov. 1, 1989, at 58. Rodney Ballek, a Citibank executive responsible for the deal
said, "the deal fell apart, not because of fundamental flaws in structure or pricing, but because of
a litany of adverse events affecting the market's attitude to leveraged deals in general and airline
financings in particular." Id. at 67.
50. See Henry S. Terrel & Michael G. Martinson, Arranging and Marketing Syndicated Eurocurrency
Loans, in INTERNATIONAL BORROWING: NEGOTIATING AND STRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL DEBT
TRANSACTIONS 186 (Daniel D. Bradlow ed., 1994).
51. "Country risk, broadly defined, comprises those risks associated with claims against (economic
agents in) a particular country, including but not limited to claims on the government of that
country." Donald R. Lessard, Country Risk and the Structure of International Financial
Intermediation, in INTL. FIN. 452 (Dilip K. Das ed., 1993). See also Nigel Carter & Michael Stocks,
Country Risk Assessment, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND INVESTMENT. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATE
BANKING 457 (Brian Terry ed., 1990).
52. "Sovereign risks arise only in transactions with a sovereign, such as lending, whereas country
risks involve the whole host of credit risks peculiar to transacting business in a particular nation."
Daniel W Heleniac, Sovereign Risks, in CURRENT ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE LAW 85 (David
Pierce et al. eds., 1985).
53. For details about political risk in sovereign lending, see ANATOLE KALETSKY, THE COSTS OF DEFAULT
7-11 (1985)..
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to other areas of the world, such as Asia or Eastern Europe.54 Events like this could cause a
syndicated loan transaction to fail. Accordingly, before delivering a formal offer, arrangers
have to test the market first and then secure the funds to be provided. In order to do that,
arrangers need to have a guideline of the conditions the borrower is willing to accept. They
require an acceptance from the borrower of the business terms which are going to be repre-
sented by a mandate letter.55
In spite of the above, according to English and American law, a document is not a
contract just because it is denominated as a "letter of intent" or because the lender believes
that the document is not legally enforceable. In an English case, Wilson Smithett & Cape
(Sugar) Ltd. v. Bangladesh Sugar & Food Indus. Corp.,5 6 it was held that the particular label
for identifying the document (letter of intent) was not an indication of its legal nature.
The wording of the letter of intent, expressing the objective intention of the parties, is the
crucial factor for the courts to determine if the document is intended to be contractually
enforceable or not. Another important element courts would consider is the surrounding
circumstances of the transaction. In general, English courts will look at the purpose of
construing the document, at the document itself, at the surrounding circumstances, and at
what happened whenever the document was brought into existence.5 7 Similarly, Canadian
courts will examine "the document's purpose, its construction, the parties' conduct and
the surrounding circumstances.'5 8 However, American courts have a wider spectrum
when the subject-matter is letters of intent. In the United States, good faith has been regu-
larly added to the obligations deriving from pre-contractual agreements. In a New York
case, Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass'n of America v. Tribune Co.,59 the following elements
were considered by the court in examining letters of intent: (1) the language of the docu-
ment; (2) the context of the-negotiations; (3) open terms not included in the preliminary
54. LARS KALDEREN AND QAMAR S. SIDDIQI, SOVEREIGN BORROWERS: GUIDELINES ON LEGAL
NEGOTIATIONS WITH COMMERCIAL LENDERS 46 (1984).
55. Id. at 39.
56. See Wilson Smithett & Cape (Sugar) Ltd. v. Bangladesh Sugar & Food Indus. Corp., 1 Lloyd's Rep.
378 (A.B. 1985). This case refers to a supply of sugar. The buyers issued a letter of intent with the
purpose of accepting the terms and conditions of a selling offer. A paragraph of the letter stated,
"We are pleased to issue this letter to you for supply of the following materials... All other terms
and conditions will be as per your... offer dated 12.6.1981... You are advised to submit
security/deposit performance bond... within seven days from the date of issue of this letter of
intent. Id. Justice Leggat stated, "The fact that it has the particular label that it has does not
brand it at the outset as a contractual document or as a non contractual document.' Id.
57. Id. Justice Leggat said, "It is common ground that when I come to look at the document styled by
the defendants 'letter of intent, I must look for the purpose of construing it at the document
itself, at the surrounding circumstances, and what happened when it was brought into existence'
Id.
58. Mills, supra note 15, at 358.
59. Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass'n of America v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). This
case was important for the decision in Lazard Freres & Co. v. Protective Life Ins. Co., No. 94 -
3959, 1996 WL 223975 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1996). See generally Paul et al., Enforceability of
Commitment Letters for Purchase and Sale of Bank Debt; in JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING L.
494-95 (1996).
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agreement; (4) partial performance by any of the parties; and, (5) customary practice.
Also, American courts will consider whether the defendant has "failed as a matter of law to
negotiate in good faith." 60
A. THE 'SUBJECr To CONTRAC' PROVISION.
According to the English courts, in order for a letter of intent not to be a contract, an
express intention by the parties ("consensus at idem") must be included in the wording of
the document 61 In English law, the phrase "subject to contract,' (See Schedule III) is suf-
ficient to reflect that the document is a pre-contractual agreement rather than a contract
itself. There are other possible formulas, such as "subject to formal agreement" 62 "subject
to suitable agreements to being arranged'; 63 and "subject to a proper contract' 64 In our
sample letter of intent in Schedule I the following clause is used: "The financing contem-
plated in this letter is conditioned upon the preparation, execution and delivery of legal
documentation in form and substance satisfactory to us and our counsel...". Also, in
Schedule II, which is a transaction governed by New York law, the second paragraph reads
"XYZ's commitment is subject to the negotiation, execution and delivery of mutually
acceptable definitive loan documentation .. '. The language of these two examples seems to
be common to American lawyers. Unlike the English courts, where objective interpreta-
tion of the wording of the document is essential, the intention of the parties is rather deci-
sive for American courts.65
In English law, the phrase "subject to contract" has been accepted as the "term of
art" 66 to indicate that the parties have subjectively intended to have a non-binding "agree-
ment to agree."67 Lake argues that"[a] significant difference in American and English law
in the analysis of letters of intent ... is that parties to instruments governed by English law
have an almost unqualified ability to remove any doubt as to intentions by the use of the
phrase 'subject to contract'."68 In Chillingworth v. Esche,69 Sangant LJ said that "the words
'subject to contract' or 'subject to formal contract' have ... acquired a definite ascertained
legal meaning--... they are words appropriate for introducing a condition, and it would
require a very strong and exceptional case for this clear prima facie meaning to be dis-
placed:' 70 Thus, this formula is essential for avoiding legal enforceability, and in the
absence of such an express intention of the parties, letters of intent would be defined by
60. See Lazard Freres & Co., supra note 59.
61. See Mills, supra note 15, at 357-58.
62. See id at 360.
63. LAKE & DRAETA, supra note 1, at 70.
64. Chillingworth v. Esche, I Ch. 97 (1924).
65. For an analysis of the English and American courts' interpretation, see LAKE & DRAETA, supra
note 1, at 67-75.
66. Id at 69.
67. See Winn v. Bull, 7 Ch. D. 29 (1877); Rossdale v. Denny, 1 Ch. 57 (1921); LAKE & DRAErrA, supra,
note 1 at 69-70.
68. See LAKE & DRrrAA, supra note 1, at 94.
69. Chillingworth v. Esche, 1 Ch. 97 (1924).
70. Id. at 114.
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English courts as binding agreements. 7 1 Branca v. Cobarro72 represents a major English
case in this respect. The Court of Appeals held that there was a binding agreement even
though a clause of the agreement said "this is a provisional agreement until a fully 'legal-
ized agreement, drawn up by a solicitor and embodying' all the conditions herewith stated,
is signed." 73 The motive of the agreement was the selling of a mushroom farm where the
defendant agreed to sell and the plaintiff agreed to deposit some money as part of the
price.74 The plaintiff withdrew from the transaction and claimed his deposit back on the
ground that there was no binding agreement 75 After analyzing the wording of the above
mentioned clause, Lord Greene M.R. held that the agreement between the defendant and
the plaintiff was intended to be a legally enforceable contract. 76 The phrase "provisional
agreement" and the condition "until" meant that a new contract would eventually be
signed to replace the preliminary agreement.77 However, while this new contract had not
come into place the "provisional agreement" had legal force. 78 On the other hand, the fact
that the future contract - which was supposed to replace the provisional one - was said to
be a "fully legalized agreement" did not mean that the provisional agreement was not
enforceable. 79 In fact, the provisional agreement was enforceable and contained legally
binding commitments for the parties.
B. THE "SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES".
In accordance with the above, "gentleman's agreements;' or even informal business
agreements among family members80 would be regarded as legally binding and enforce-
able contracts if no indication to the contrary is made by including the "magic phrase",
subject to contract' Nevertheless, this is not necessarily an absolute truth. There is an
exceptional English case, Alpenstow Ltd v. Regalian Properties Ltd,8 1 where the phrase
"subject to contract" was not considered sufficient to identify the document as non-bind-
ing. In this case, an agreement for a real estate transaction was identified as binding even
though the clause "subject to contract" was included.82 In this case, Nourse J, referring to
71. Samos Shipping Enter. Ltd. v. Eckhardt & Co. K.G., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 378, 385 (1985). Clipper
Maritime Ltd. v. Shirlstar Container Trans. Ltd., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 546, 55 (1987). See also P.R. WOOD,
INTERNATIONAL LOANS, BONDS AND SECURITIES REGULATION 90-91 (1995). TENNEKON, supra note 5,
at 46.
72. Branca v. Cobarro, KB 854 (1947).







80. Snellingv. Snelling Ltd., 1 All E.R. 79 (1972).
81. Alpenstow Ltd., 1 W.L.R. at 721.
82. Chillingworth, 1 Ch. at 97.
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the above quoted statement of Sangant L.J in Chillingworth v. Esche 83 held: "[i]n my judg-
ment this is a case where there is a very strong and exceptional context which must induce
the court not to give the words 'subject to contract' their dear prima facie meaning, and I
so hold"8 4. This decision suggests that, although for English courts, the phrase "subject to
contract" will in principle prevent agreements from being legally binding, there is a possi-
bility that exceptional circumstances might make courts treat subject-to-contract-letters-
of-intent as legally binding agreements.
Despite the fact that the "subject to contract" provision is extremely relevant for
avoiding legal enforceability, courts might not confine themselves to the simple task of just
checking whether the phrase is printed in the document to determine the legal nature of
the agreement. As mentioned earlier, even English judges may consider other elements,
such as the purpose of the document, the document itself, and the surrounding circum-
stances. We will now focus on this last element, as its inclusion in the analysis of the legal
nature of the letter of intent reflects a departure from the classical common law approach
which limits the analysis of the agreement to the frame of the document As noted above,
in an English case, Wilson Smithett & Cape (Sugar) Ltd. v. Bangladesh Sugar & Food Indus.
Corp.,85 it was held that when the courts "come to look at the document" they "must look"
among other things "at the surrounding circumstances' 8 6 In Alpenstow Ltd. v. Regalian
Properties Ltd.,87 the circumstances related to the fact that the agreement in question
replaced and cancelled a previous legally binding agreement and created an exceptional
context to induce the court not to give the "subject to contract" provision its prima fade
meaning. In Chillingworth v.Esche,88 it was said that "there might be other circumstances"
besides the words "subject to contract': 89 Actually, courts look at the surrounding circum-
stances in order to identify the intention of the parties. In another English case, Kleinwort
Benson Ltd. v. Malaysia Mining Corp. Bhd.,90 the judge said that "the court's task is to
ascertain what common intentions should be ascribed to the parties from the terms of the
documents and the surrounding circumstances.' 9 1 There is another English case, Foley v.
Classique Coaches Ltd.,92 where the surrounding circumstances of the negotiations were
also important to reach a decision.
83. Chillingworth v. Esche, 1 Ch. 97 (1924).
84. Alpenstow Ltd., 1 W.L.R. at 732.
85. Wilson Smithett & Cape Sugar Ltd.,1 lUoyd's Rep. at 379.
86. Id.
87. Alpenstow Ltd.v. Regalian Properties Ltd., 1 W.L.R. at 730. Justice Nourse said, "Speaking gener-
ally, you would expect to find the words'subject to contract' at the preliminary stage of a negotia-
tion, not as here, some four to five months on. You would not expect to find them, as you do
here, in a detailed and conscientiously drawn document which admittedly cancelled and replaced
a previous binding agreement. I can well see that the question may not previously have arisen in
circumstances such as these' Id
88. Chillingworth, 1 Ch at 111.
89. Id.
90. Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Malaysia Mining Corp. Bhd., 1 W.L.R. 379,384 (1989).
91. Id at 386.
92. Foley v. Classique Coaches Ltd., 2 KB 1 (CA. 1934).
90 NAFFA: Law and Business Review of the Americas
For American courts, the intention of the parties is essential for determining the nature
of the agreement; therefore, the surrounding circumstances play a key role for American
judges. In Itek Corp. v. Chicago Aerial Indus. Inc.,93 the circumstances surrounding the nego-
tiations determined that the parties intended to be bound by the letter of intent.
C. INTENDED BINDING OBLIGATIONS DERIVING FROM THE LETrER OF INTENT.
1. Obligations of the Borrower.
Even though in most cases letters of intent are intended not to be firm commitments,
mandate letters in syndicated loans are actually written in a certain way that constitute
binding agreements with respect to certain issues. The borrower, when signing and deliver-
ing the mandate, is obliged from this moment to pay fees and expenses to the lender for
the arrangement of the loan. This obligation of the borrower continues regardless of
whether the credit is finally granted or not. In Schedule I, the clause titled "Expenses"
shows that the borrower, upon signing the offer and returning it to the lender, agrees to
pay expenses and fees "incurred in the negotiation, preparation and execution" of the loan.
Moreover, the clause points out that "these expenses are reimbursable promptly on
demand after execution of the loan documentation or if the documentation is not execut-
ed by April 30, 1991 after that date." Even if the loan is not formalized, the expenses and
fees would still be owed to the lender. Schedule II is even more specific about this matter.
By making the borrower return a different letter (the "mandate"), the lender requires the
borrower through this mandate letter (see Schedule II, Exhibit A) to expressly include that
he "agrees to pay Arranger, XYZ and the Lenders' reasonable out of-pocket costs and
expenses... regardless of whether any loan documents are agreed to and signed by the
lenders and the Borrower and regardless of whether any loans are actually made."
2. Obligations of the Lender.
Another binding commitment is the obligation of the lender or arranger to use his
best endeavours or best efforts94 in order to finalize the financing arrangement as offered
to the borrower. Moreover, at least for American courts, there is an implied obligation of
good faith to finalize agreements referred to in letters of intent. These obligations are
abstract obligations that are difficult to enforce inasmuch as they reflect uncertain and
unspecific legal concepts. For example, a best endeavours clause provides for an abstract
provision without specific measure or standard. Its determination will depend on a sub-
jective interpretation by the courts.
D. BEsT ENDEAVOURS OR BEST EFFORTS.
With respect to the borrower's obligation to pay fees and expenses, there does not
seem to be any doubt that there is an obligation to pay for the financial service the lender
is providing. In relation to the best endeavours obligation, it appears to be difficult for the
93. Itek Corp. v. Chicago Aerial Indus., Inc., 248 A.2d 625 (Del. 1968).
94. "Best endeavours" is the expression commonly used in England while "best efforts" is used in the
United States.
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plaintiff to prove a breach of such an obligation inasmuch as there is no specific standard
at which to look. 95 In an English case, Bower v. Bantam Inv. Ltd.,9 6 an injunction was
refused because there was no specific obligation to use best endeavours to develop a mari-
na project Goff J said "I ask myself, could anything be less specific or more uncertain?
There is absolutely no criterion by which best endeavours and practicability are to be
judged."97 In a few words, the judge argued that best endeavours duties cannot be obliga-
tions because they do not represent something specific to do or fulfill. 98 However,
Karamanolis argues that "best efforts" imply a certain direction to the bank to implement
"professional judgment, technical skills and specialist personnel." 99 But, again, this appre-
ciation is still too subjective in the sense that it is discretionary for the bank to use its par-
ticular technique and judgment and to designate the employees it believes are adequate for
managing the transaction. Therefore, the best endeavours or best efforts provision gives
the lender or arranger a unilateral consideration of what he may or may not do to raise the
corresponding funds. Ultimately, courts will make a case-by-case analysis focusing on the
kind of promise and the relation of such a promise to the promisor's implicit skills.
There might be no difficulty for courts to enforce best endeavours obligations if the
lack of diligence is obvious. In an American case, Grossman v. Lowell, 100 a best efforts duty
of a purchaser to find a loan was breached because the purchaser made very few attempts
to pursue the expected results (three telephone calls and one mortgage application). But
again, the analysis of the best efforts duty depends on each particular situation. The ques-
tion will always arise: What is the level of efforts required? (e.g. How many calls, meetings
or letters should one make in order to comply with the best efforts provision?)
In financial services, a certain best efforts standard could be identified. For instance,
the syndication of a loan incorporates a process which invokes a certain sequence of steps
and implies specific activities such as inviting banks to participate in the loan (marketing
the loan), assisting the borrower in preparing the information memorandum, and drafting
and negotiating loan agreements. 10 ' The arranger should possess specific technical skills
and experience for managing the syndication process. According to this, we ask ourselves
what is the level of efforts required by the promisor (the arranger)? The common test for
American courts in cases when a promisor offers special skills and experience to others
who lack it is to ask "what efforts a third person - a person possessing those skills - would
use if that person were in the promisor's place."10 2 The syndication business is a particular
area which involves specialized banks. Normally, all syndicated credit transactions have
similar characteristics and specialized banks follow a certain pattern. Thus it appears that
the test would certainly proceed for these transactions. A standard of best efforts could be
defined by analyzing the customary practice of persons involved in that business.
95. DONALDSON, supra note 48, at 83. See also DuFEY & GIDDY, supra note 49, at 251.
96. Bower v. Bantam Inv. Ltd., 3 All E.R. 349 (1972).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See KARAMANOLIS, supra note 36, at 63.
100. Grossman v. Lowell, 703 E Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
101. See UNITAR, supra note 23 at 107; see CLARK, ET AL., supra note 48, at 410-11; see also Davies &
Halliday, supra note 8, at 182.
102. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNswOmI- ON CONTRACrs 9 (1990).
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E. GOOD FAITH.
Even though the terms good faith and best efforts might be mistakenly seen as syn-
onyms, they are different concepts which imply different duties. Whereas best efforts obliga-
tions are related to the concept of diligence of the promisor, good faith is connected with
honesty and fair dealing.10 3 Good faith obligations exist in American law. The United
States Uniform Commercial Code establishes that either contracts or other duties regulated
by this Code impose "an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement" 10 4
Moreover, American courts have begun to define letters of intent as enforceable whenever-
there there is a lack of good faith to use best efforts to finalize the contract. English courts,
on the other hand, are reluctant to impose any liability in tort for breach of contract. 10 5
Accordingly, duties of good faith and fair dealing in contractual obligations are rarely con-
sidered by these courts.10 6 In the case of pre-contractual agreements, the situation would be
even more strict as they are not intended to be binding agreements. In an Arkansas case,
Sterling Faucet Co. v. First Mun. Leasing Corp.,10 7 the court held that a letter of intent was
enforceable and represented a binding commitment even though it contained a phrase that
indicated the commitment was conditioned on further documentation being "satisfactory
in substance and form to all parties"108 The court stated that there was a lack of good faith
from the lender to decide if credit documents were satisfactory. Cases such as this show the
importance of drafting letters of intent with express and detailed language to assure that the
borrower is clear that there is a non binding commitment from the lender or arranger.109
In this regard, Weisman suggests the following wording:
This letter sets forth proposed terms for discussion purposes only, and is not a
commitment or an offer to lend.110
As mentioned earlier, the borrower accepts the terms and conditions of the offer letter
by returning a mandate letter to the lender or arranger. At this moment, the borrower
counts on the lender or arranger to raise the money required, and the lender might incur
losses for the borrower if the transaction fails. In an American case, 999 v. C.T Corp.,"l '
$1 million in damages were awarded to a borrower who alleged that the lender had made a
firm commitment to lend. Lack of good faith is the basis for court decisions in cases like
this. If it is proved that the borrower has "reasonable expectations" that the financing, will
be provided, a binding agreement could be considered to exist. The existence of reason-
able expectations would derive from the language of the mandate which would express
103. See idL at 8; LAKE & DRAETTA, supra note 1, at 178; ROY GOODE, COMMERCI LAW 542,574 (1995).
104. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1981). For details about the U.C.C. with respect to this matter, see Orrin G.
Hatches, Good Faith under the Uniform Commercial Code, 23 U. Plrrs. L. REV. 754 (1962). See also
Joseph J. Norton, Lender Liability in the United States: A Decade in Perspective, in BANKS, LIABILITY,
AND RISK 365-67 (Ross Cranston ed., 1995).
105. See BANKS, LIABILrrY, AND RISK, supra note 104, at 36-37 (Ross Cranston ed., 1995).
106. GOODE, supra note 103, at 100; see also Parker Hood, Lender Liability Under English Law, in
BANKS, LIABIUTY, AND RISK 33 (Ross Cranston ed., 1995).
107. Sterling Faucet Co. v. First Mun. Leasing Corp.,(N.D. Ill. 1972), aff'd 716 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1983).
108. Id. at 9.
109. See Weissman, supra note 21, at 2-3.
110. Id. at 3.
111. 999 v. CIT Corp., 776 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1985).
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that a firm commitment has been made by the lender. In another American case, Hoffman
v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.,113 the court awarded damages to the borrower because it was decid-
ed that there was substantial reliance on the offer of the lender. However, the decision was
based on the fact that one party, a small company, was not as sophisticated as the other, a
bank. Promissory estoppel was the legal action used to enforce good faith and the argu-
ment was that the bank's promise made the other party act in a certain way with the
expectation that the promise would be fulfilled. 114
In Itek Corp. v. Chicago Aerial Indus., Inc.,115 and Thompson v. Liquichemica of
America, Inc.,1 16 it was held that good faith represents a contractual obligation when par-
ties have undertaken to use best efforts to prepare and conclude a contract. In this respect,
parties must act in good faith in order to use best efforts to achieve a result. In Thompson
v. Liquichemica, the judge stated that"[ulnlike an'agreement to agree, which does not con-
stitute a 'closed' proposition, and consequently is not an agreement at all, an agreement to
use best efforts is a dosed proposition, discrete and actionable. Such an agreement does
not require that the agreement sought to be achieved, but does require that the parties
work to achieve it actively and in good faith." 117
In a recent American case, Lazard Freres & Co v. Protective Life Ins. Co.,118 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that commitment letters
in bank debt transactions can constitute legally binding obligations and the "execution of a
binding preliminary agreement requires a party to continue good faith efforts to finalize a
contract.": 19 In this case, a condition in the commitment letter existed which established
that the agreement was subject to the "'preparation, review and execution of documenta-
tion acceptable to Lazard and Protective."' 120 In spite of this, the court decided that this
"condition precedent" was excused as the defendant "failed as a matter of law to negotiate
in good faith."1 21 This case provides an important basis in the United States for identify-
ing letters of intent as binding agreements if good faith efforts have not been fulfilled. With
respect to this case, the New York law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison
suggests the following clause in order to express more dearly a non-binding intention:
[T]his commitment letter creates no binding obligations whatsoever, and
the parties intend to be bound only after closing documentation has been
agreed upon and executed by both parties. 122
112. Weissman, supra note 21, at 6-7.
113. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores Inc., 133 N.W. 2d 267(Wis. 1965).
114. See Mills, supra note 15, at 383-87.
115. Itek Corp. v. Chicago A Indus. Inc., 248 A.2d 625 (Del. 1968).
116. Thompson v. Liquichimica of America, Inc., 481 . Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
117. Id. at 366.





122. See Paul et al., supra note 59, at 495.
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The same New York law firm states:
Based on our experiences, parties executing commitment letters generally
intend to be bound to proceed in good faith towards dosing and to negotiate
in good faith closing documentation. Parties do not intend to give each other
'free options'.to walk away from the deal under the guise of failing to agree on
definitive documentation. 123
Unlike the United States, English law takes a different approach regarding letters of
intent. This system of law identifies the letter of intent either as a contract or as an "agree-
ment to agree' which is not enforceable. No intermediate solution exists. However, in the
United States, the courts' interpretation is wider. In the case mentioned, it might be said
that there is a binding agreement to negotiate in good faith. 124 But in many cases, depend-
ing on the circumstances, courts have also taken the all-or-nothing approach. Moreover, a
letter of intent has been held as enforceable in one situation and as not enforceable in a
smilar situation. In any case, the decision will rely on the particular cases and no specific
prediction can be made. Therefore, lawyers should use very clear wording which denotes
specifically the intention of the parties.
V. Legal Actions and Remedies for the Sovereign Borrower.
The borrower would incur a great loss if the arranger bank came to him and said,
"Sorry, we thought we could do it but...."125 On the other hand, the arranger, besides
demanding at least reimbursement of costs and expenses, will deny any liability and will
refuse to pay the borrower for losses and damages as a consequence of the syndication fail-
ure. 126 Normally, the arranger, who has signed a letter of intent which includes the respec-
tive wording that excludes contractual liability, will retract from any obligation to the bor-
rower. Considering this situation, what legal actions could the borrower take?
The first important issue to examine is if the promise to arrange financing, contained in
the letter of intent, involves contractual liability. As we have pointed out above, the wording
of the document will play an essential role for determining the legal nature of the document
In the event the "subject to contract" provision appears, then a strong likelihood of a non
binding commitment is present However, the surrounding circumstances of the transaction
should also be observed in order to define the objective intention of the parties. As we have
mentioned earlier, this is more accentuated by American courts than by English courts. If the
letter of intent is a binding agreement, remedies will be those of breach of contract 127
Nevertheless, even though the promise to complete the syndicated financing is not
binding, there remains an obligation upon the lender to use its best endeavours to com-
123. See id.
124. See Mills, supra note 15, at 385; see also Thompson, 481 E Supp. 365.
125. DuFEY & GIDDY, supra note 49, at 247; see also Lee, supra note 49, at 64, for a case where the share
price of a borrower greatly declined when the loan collapsed.
126. For an example of a $7.2 billion syndicated loan to United Airlines which failed and arrangers
refused to accept its responsibility, see Lee, supra note 49, at 58.
127. For an explanation about remedies for breach of contract, see Goode, supra note 103, at 115-132.
See also PicHARD TUFFARO, LENDER LtABILrry LMGAnON: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 29-34 (1987).
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plete the transaction. In this respect, it should be ascertained whether the bank has execut-
ed the arranging activity with a sufficient degree of diligence to fulfill the best endeavours
obligation. Another issue to observe is whether there was bad faith on the part of the
arranger by not finalizing the financing. As previously explained above, to determine bad
faith on the part of the defendant, the plaintiff must prove "reasonable expectations" or
"substantial reliance" in the defendant's promise. If these claims proceed, the remedy
would be reliance damages. 128 In the United States, promissory estoppel could be a possi-
bility when it is proved that the borrower relied on the lender's promise. Besides English
law's promissory estoppel being "fundamentally" different from the United States, a cause
of action for promissory estoppel exists in the latter while not in the former.129 Negligent
misrepresentation might be another cause of action. This concept requires that: (i) a rep-
resentation is made; (ii) the defendant has particular skills that made the plaintiff reason-
ably rely on an express promise; and (iii) there was damage caused to the plaintiff as a con-
sequence of the reliance to the defendant. 130 In this respect, Mills states that "a letter of
intent could be characterized by a plaintiff as a representation made by the defendant to
bargain in good faith" '131
Another cause of action, though unlikely to succeed, is fraud.132 There is a case, Kas v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 133 where after a syndicated loan arrangement collapsed,
plaintiff sued the defendants for fraud and misrepresentation. 'The plaintiff alleged they
purchased some shares of UAL Corporation after relying on the defendant's fraudulent
representation contained in a financing letter of intent the defendants asserted in their let-
ter of intent that they were "highly confident" 134 to arrange financing to the management
group (Airline Acquisition Corporation) which was interested in acquiring UAL. Because
of the defendant's failure to raise financing, UAL stock suffered an important decline in
price, and consequently the plaintiff incurred losses. The complaint was dismissed, as
there were insufficient arguments to prove "conscious behavior" 135 by the lender to consti-
tute fraud. The judge stated that "[ilntending to participate in a risky transaction is not
the equivalent of intending to perpetrate a fraud'1
36
Inasmuch as this essay attempts to focus on the legal nature of the letter of intent, we
will not concentrate on the analysis of the lender's liability. In considering the existence of
a contractual promise to lend in a letter of intent, study of the "amorphous concept"
137 of
lender liability can be analysed. 138 At least, it is important to understand that, in general,
remedies for lender liability would be limited to damages. This means that specific perfor-
128. Mills, supra note 15, at 355.
129. Hood, supra note 106, at 29.
130. See Mills, supra note 15, at 371. See also LAKE & DRAETrA, supra note 1 at 193-95.
131. See Mills, supra note 15, at 371.
132. LAKE & DRAETrA, supra note 1, at 196.
133. Kas v. Chase Manhattan Bank, NA., No. 90 Civ. 44 (MBM), 1991 WL 275754, at 1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
16, 1991).
134. Id. at 3.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 6.
137. Hood, supra note 106, at 15, states that "lender liability is a somewhat amorphous concept."
138. For English law, see CRANSTON, supra note 90. For United States law, see WEIssMAN, supra note 21;
TuFFARo, supra note 127.
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mance is not applicable. Accordingly, the damages that can be claimed would be, for
instance, higher interest, and the costs and expenses incurred by the borrower for having
to arrange a different loan.139
VI. Conclusion.
We have observed in this essay that, legally speaking, letters of intent are abstract doc-
uments which are made in order to regulate the pre-contractual scenario of a business
transaction. In English and American law, the intention of the parties is the main issue to
define the legal nature of agreements. Generally speaking, letters of intent are not intended
to be binding agreements. For either English or American courts, the language of the doc-
ument will be the key factor in defining the intention of the parties. However, the sur-
rounding circumstances are also taken into consideration, even more so in the case of
American law, where judges have been less attached to the wording and have rather
stepped a little aside from the the written agreement to look for the objective intention of
the parties.
In syndicated loans, letters of intent set up the terms and conditions of the credit
while establish at the same time an obligation from the borrower to pay certain fees. On
the other hand, letters of intent express an obligation upon the arranger to exercise its
"best endeavours" to finalize the financing. Borrowers should be aware of the legal nature
of the document they are willing to sign. Regularly, lenders will say that letters of intent
contain a unilateral obligation from the borrower to carry the costs and expenses of the
preliminary process, even if positive progress is not achieved by the lender. The latter,
however, would not be willing to commit itself more than in a "best endeavours" basis.
Borrowers must understand that the "best endeavours" obligation of the lender is an
unspecific term which is intended to leave the determination of the standard of efforts to
the lender's own means. However, even on a best efforts basis, arrangers assume a signifi-
cant risk when issuing funding commitment letters. 140 Institutions, such as those involved
in the syndicated financing business, have specific expertise in this matter, which causes
borrowers to rely on them. Besides that, the customary practice of the business might cre-
ate certain expectations from those institutions to utilize some standard of efforts for com-
pleting the syndicated credit. Therefore, lenders should be aware that even though the
completion of the transaction is subject to "best efforts", these duties can be enforced by
the borrower by analyzing the customary practice and defining a standard of diligence.
Moreover, a loss in reputation for banks can follow as a consequence of a syndicated
loan collapse. The United Airlines syndicated finance's failure as explained in Kas v. Chase
139. See PHILIP WOOD, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATONAL INSOLVENCY 338 (1995). See also South African
Territories v. Wallington, 1 App. Cas. 309 (1898).
140. In Kas, supra note 133, the judge stated that "[iln fact, the UAL transaction is an excellent illustra-
tion of the significant risk financial institutions assume in issuing funding commitment letters.
The UAL transaction failed because of defendants' inability to obtain financing, and rather than
attaining prestige and market leadership, defendants were blamed for the financial 'fiasco of the
decade'" 1991 WL 275754, at 3.
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Manhattan Bank, N.A. is an important example. 14 1 Referring to this case, where well rec-
ognized banks such as Citibank and Chase Manhattan were the main actors, a Euromoney
article pointed out that, "[t]he collapse of the $7.2 billion United Airlines buyout loan is a
story of error upon error, of proud reputations suddenly tarnished' 142 As a matter of fact,
besides arrangers' interest in finishing the deal and charging their commission, there is a
pressure upon them not to damage their reputation if the deal falls down. In this sense,
arrangers would use their best efforts to complete the syndicated loan. Nevertheless, from
the point of view of borrowers and more importantly, sovereign borrowers, the question is
not just one of reputation if a syndicated loan collapses. A borrower would be affected by
material losses if another financing is not efficiently achieved to replace the original one.
Furthermore, in the case of sovereign lending, the failure of a credit might lead to the fail-
ure of a State project development, which will consequently affect the socioeconomic wel-
fare of a country.
Letters of intent must establish conditions and obligations which are clearly under-
standable to the borrower and the lender. Specifically, sovereign borrowers, before accept-
ing a financing proposal, should be aware of the conditions the proposal contains.
Moreover, sovereign borrowers must negotiate a letter of intent which provides better war-
ranties for finalizing the financing. For instance, Gurria-Trevino suggests sovereign bor-
rowers should avoid "best effort offers" because they imply a non-specific commitment
from the lender.143 However, based on the volatility of the financial market, only desperate
banks would accept committing themselves to a syndicated loan arrangement on an
unconditional basis before analyzing the market's appetite for the loan. Accordingly, sover-
eign borrowers, such as entities responsible for State indebtedness, must choose experi-
enced and well-known financial institutions which are concerned about not threatening
their prestige by signing letters of intent for unsuccessful syndicated credits. 144 Definitely,
regarding the volatility of the financial markets, it would be also convenient for sovereign
borrowers and more specifically for FBCAs 145 to alleviate their long and complicated
internal legal process of authorization.
141. Kas, supra note 133, at 1.
142. See Lee, supra note 49, at 58.
143. Gurria-Trevino, supra note 6, at 391.
144. See Papanicolaou, supra note 6, at 48.
145. See supra Part III, 5 2.
